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The court opinion that required radioactive waste disposal to be
considered in the licensing of reactors gave legal weight to the growing
public concern about the management and control of this part of the nuclear
fuel cycle.1 It served to emphasize once again the growing difficulty of
dealing with technological issues in our society, issues that raise central
questions of decisionmaking, of management, and of regulation.
In fact, the ability to reach decisions about technically complex
and necessarily risky issues, and to proceed with implementation of those
decisions, is becoming one of the central concerns of governance in indus-
trial.societies. It is not too strong to state that fundamental values of
our political system are at stake. Essential needs must be met. If decision
processes to meet those needs become stalemated the pressures for more
authoritarian modes of governance will grow. But, the preservation of open
decision processes that do not lead to stalemate is a difficult task that is
likely to get harder, not easier, in the future.
1. Aeschliman v. NRC, Nos. 73-1776 and 73-1867 (D.C. Circuit, July 21, 1976).
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The management of radioactive waste is an excellent example of
a complex and risk-laden issue. It relates to the basic requirement for
energy, but also involves long-term questions of safety and control. It
is closely tied to issues of national security, and raises emotional spectres
of nuclear danger. Moreover, it also has the characteristics of issues
that are the hardest to deal with: the level of uncertainty is high, the
technology is esoteric and not easily accessible, the evaluations of risk
are contentious -- even among experts -- and the opportunity for demagoguery
on all sides of the question is therefore substantial. Moreover, signi-
ficant economic and political interests are at stake, further exacerbating the
problem of dealing with the issue successfully.
Other papers at this conference will be concerned in detail with
analysis of alternative policies for radioactive waste management. It is
not the purpose here to develop these alternatives independently. Rather,
it is to point up what is necessary to reach decisions about those alter-
natives and to carry them out. Whatever the particular preferred choices
may be, any policies considered for radioactive waste management will have
to be concerned with several specific considerations that deserve to be singled
out:
-- The longevity of some of the waste products will appear
to create a requirement for unprecedented governmental
control of the material. Whether this is in fact a
serious technical difficulty is presumably in question
and is related to other issues, but the perception of
that requirement will undoubtedly have to be reckoned
with.
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-- The difficulty of handling radioactive waste is bound
up with the decision about reprocessing and the develop-
ment of breeder reactors. The reprocessing of spent
fuel elements to recover plutonium and uranium may
make the waste physically easier to dispose of, but
that policy cannot be decided in isolation from the
broader questions raised by the reprocessing issue.
-- Responsibility for nuclear waste management and
regulation in the U.S. is divided among many agencies
and institutions. ERDA has primary R & D responsi-
bility, and NRC and EPA have the major regulatory
responsibility at the Federal level, with the States
also involved.
-- Management.authority is divided between ERDA and
private industry, with the DOD also playing a role.
The International Atomic Energy Agency is involved at
the international level, but so far plays only a
facilitating role for analysis and consultations on
waste management issues.
Any resolution of waste management issues will require
attention to the capability of institutions to carry
out management and regulatory tasks. Even a decision
to halt nuclear power development in the U.S. would
not avoid the problem since there is already consider-
able waste from existing power reactors and military
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programs in temporary or questionable storage. And
other countries will proceed with nuclear power, what-
ever the U.S. decides.
It is possible that a new institution for management
of nuclear waste will be necessary in the U.S., either
by expanding the responsibility of an existing agency,
or by creating a new "authority" for that purpose.
Institutional development on the international scene
may also be necessary.
-- The concern over the length of time for which nuclear
wastes continue to pose hazards has a reverse consi-
deration. Should storage be carried out so that the
waste is retrievable for better disposal as waste dis-
posal technologies improve, or to allow the possibility
of recovery of the stored energy by a future generation,
in the case of unreprocessed fuel rod storage? The
time scales involved in radioactive waste seem to lend
an unusual caste to the choices involved, though in
fact management of hazardous stable chemicals have
some similar characteristics.
-- Radioactive waste storage must be concerned not only with
the disposal of spent fuel and its byproducts, but also
with contaminated plants and other facilities no longer
operating. Thus, a major factor in the design and
licensing process for power reactors will have to be the
plans for dealing with the plant after its useful life, an
issue likely to arouse considerable local controversy if
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plants have to be left sealed for any substantial
length of time.
In attempting to come to grips with these and related issues
in the policy process, and to carry out the decisions reached, there are
a number of observations about technology in the public arena that need
to be kept in mind.
1. There is no such thing as a riskless technology.
This is obvious, but the subtle characteristics of risk associated
with particular technologies often make acceptance of risk difficult in
practice in the political process. The risks associated with technologies
already in place are often ignored when new technologies with evident risks
are being considered; the patent risks of a new technology are not easily
weighed against the much less certain risks of foregoing the technology;
the risks of a.new technology are easily seen and may arouse emotional
reactions because of their nature rather than their scale (particularly
relevant to nuclear technologies); the new risks may threaten different
segments of society than do those of existing technologies; the risks of new
technologies have different characteristics (e.g., individually assumed vs.
socially imposed) than those that are already part of everyday life.
Obviously, we are dealing here with comparisons of risks and
of benefits associated with those risks. But this is not a wholly quanti-
tative comparison, even if all the information about the technologies and
their effects were available. Risk comparisons are partly quantitative,
dealing with apparent matters of fact, but are also bound up with emotional,
economic, political and personal aspects that are necessarily subjective.
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2. Agreement by experts on the risks associated with use
of specific technologies is not to be expected, even for those
aspects that are apparently amenable to quantitative assessment.
It is obvious that if overall risk assessment is subjective, it
must involve matters of value as well as fact so that one would not expect
agreement a priori. But, why is agreement even on the quantitative or
factual aspects not usually or easily achievable?
The problem is simply that policy choices involving new technology
are concerned with future actions and thus necessarily involve uncertainty.
That means that assessments involve extrapolations of present information
(which itself may be imprecise or in dispute), and therefore depend on
judgment, analytical competence and imagination. All of those not only
vary from individual to individual, but are also affected by an individual's
attitude or stake in the issue and in its broader implications.
The range of disagreement to be expected is not predetermined,
it will vary with how much is known, how big a step from the present is
being proposed, whether there is agreement on what the issue actually is,
and how much testing, experimentation and study is possible. A rough con-
sensus among most of the experts is possible if a great deal is known
about the technology, the issues are reasonably clear and agreed, the
number-of relevant professions small, and the non-technical stakes are not
too large (compare the fluoridation controversy, for example, with
debates over nuclear safety). Of course, on new complex issues, those
conditions are rarely satisfied.
In general, the more significant the technological step under
discussion, which usually correlates with the importance of the issue in
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social terms, the less likely there is to be agreement by the "experts"
on the definition of the issues and on the technical aspects. Uncertainty
can be reduced through research, but it rarely can be removed entirely
in advance since in large part that could only be done by actually intro-
ducing the technology and observing its effects. Even that is not suf-
ficient where scale or long-term consequences are the basis of important
disagreements.
Unfortunately, it is also unlikely that disagreements among
experts will be sharp and amenable to clear exposition. There are likely
to be variations in the competence of "experts," and the relationship of
any important technological issue to broader concerns usually guarantees
that different groups will see the questions in different terms.
3. No one who has become a party to a public policy debate
can remain completely disinterested, so that bias or point
of view necessarily color risk assessments.
There is a corollary to the preceding point in that the existence of
inextricable value aspects of most issues implies that completely dis-
interested analyses by experts, or for that matter by any parties to an
issue, are not possible. Obviously, this is a matter of degree, and is
affected by the extent of an individual's involvement and the signficance of
an issue. But, scientists as well as politicians are not immun; scientists
too, are likely to be influenced in their professional judgment by their
policy preferences. In fact, it is not uncommon to observe scientists and
others use their expertise in an advocacy role, consciously or unconsciously
using information selectively. This does not mean there are no important
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and useful benefits to be realized by going as far as possible to reach
agreement on the technical aspects of an issue; quite the contrary, but
the limits must be recognized.
Note that the inevitable existence of bias applies to all parties
of interest. Public interest groups are also strongly affected by their
goals and their environment as are industry or government representatives.
George Wald's implication that nuclear power skeptics are more likely to be
right because they have "nothing to gain" should not be accorded weight (for
that reason) in evaluating arguments regarding the risks of nuclear power.
Conflict of interest is pervasive, insidious, and also subtle.
The problem, of course, is not to rule out all analysts as
ineligible, but to determine how to proceed recognizing that on important
issues most people are interested parties.
4. The participation of the lay public in technological
decisionmaking does not guarantee sensible decisions, nor
that there is understanding of the issues involved.
Public participation in decisions about technology can have many
justifications. The most pragmatic are the public's increasing wariness
about the effects of new technology,3 and the growing need to allow
participation by interested parties in order to reach decisions that are,
in fact, acceptable.
But, this objective of greater public participation often founders
on lack of responsible attention by the public, or is reflected in plans
2. George Wald, NYT, February 29, 1976, p. E-15.
3. LaPorte and Mettay, -"Technology Observed: Attitudes of a Wary Public,"
Science, Vol. 188, April 11, 1975, pp. 121-127.
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. 4for unrealistic citizen feedback schemes, or involves groups who do not
necessarily reflect the views of those they claim to represent. Time,
attention, interest, and competence to understand the details are often
lacking; and factors such as manner of presentation, personality of the
protagonists, skepticism of authority, and often widely varying personal
objectives (such as employment vs. environment) condition the quality of
public participation, especially when -- as is almost always the case --
public exposure time is extremely limited.
Inevitably, therefore, the public, or rather the different publics,
must have available formal or informal means to be "represented." If
elected representatives are not sufficient representation, and increasingly
they are not, other means and institutions are necessary. And the
representation must be such that it provides, and is seen as providing,
effective participation in the decision process.
5. Access to relevant information and analysis is a
necessary though not sufficient, condition for effec-
tive participation of interested parties (or their
representatives).
When dealing with high technology issues, there is often a natural
monopoly of relevant information and competence on the part of government
or industry with the greatest stake in proceeding with the technology. At
the same time there are usually few individuals outside the immediate
protagonists who can digest technical information, reduce it to policy
terms, ask the relevant questions, understand the alternatives and
participate meaningfully in policy discussions. The public debates over
4. Leonard et al., "Minerva: A Participatory Technology System,"
BAS, November 1971,_pp. 4-12.
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weapons systems in recent years were only made possible because former
government and industry employees with both experience and knowledge
5
elected to enter the lists.
The need for information and analysis to be more widely available
may be just as difficult to meet in unclassified civilian technology areas,
even without security problems; it is essential that it be met. It will
require conscious measures to make information available, and to build a
cadre of analysts able to use the information.
It is counterproductive for the protagonists of a technology to
assume they are better off if the public at large is ignorant about a
technology, leaving decisions to knowledgeable experts. Today's skepticism
about the effects of technology coupled with technological ignorance leaves
society prey to demogoguery. The absence of trusted responsible analysts
enhances the power of irresponsible analysts, just as the absence of
trusted, responsible protagonists of technological systems enhances the
power of special interest groups in industry and government.
Disagreement among experts who have been given access to information
certainly complicates the problem of reaching decisions, but it is even
more dangerous to allow opposition based on fear and ignorance by withholding
information. The challenge is to build a process based on information
and knowledge so as to be able to reach acceptable policies, even if they are not
necessarily optimum from any single point of view.
That injunction leads directly to the final proposition which in many
ways is a prerequisite for reaching effective agreement on complex, risky, but
needed technological action.
5. Anne Cahn, Eggheads and Warheads, Scientists and the ABM, (Cambridge,
C.I.S., M.I.T., 1975)
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6. The willingness of a society to accept a technological
decision that is not fully understood and that carries the
frisk of unfavorable consequences along with its benefits,
even when there has been adequate opportunity for debate
and participation, depends fundamentally on the existence
.of trust and confidence in the essential fairness of the
society.
No efforts at public participation, discussion, dissemination of
information or other measures with regard to a complex technology carrying
possible risk, will be of much use in achieving willing acceptance unless
there is a substantial degree of trust in the system. In the not too distant
past, decisions by experts with little public discussion were relatively
easily accepted. Early decisions about nuclear power, many technical
military and foreign policy choices, and others in complex technological
areas were made with little public debate. The experts had legitimacy; they
were trusted to represent all interests on subjects not accessible to the
public at large, and it was assumed the issues could be treated largely
as technical questions.
But that trust was later seen to be misplaced; some decisions
turned out to be representative only of specific interests, others turned
out to be made on too narrow a base of knowledge or analysis, and some had
serious adverse consequences. As a result, we are in a new era in which
the testimony of experts, especially those in government or industry, is
often devalued, challenged, suspect. Yet, that, too, must not be allowed to
last, for immobility is also a decision and may also have serious
consequences.
There must be a middle ground in which there is sufficient open-
ness to explore issues adequately, and sufficient trust to reach closure
on a debate and accept a decision even when that implies injury to some
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parties at interest, or more general risk to the society. That can
only happen if the process of decision is, and is seen to be, fair, which
also means that it represents everyone, or at least those most affected by
the decision.
Willingness to share information, to open issues for discussion,
to bring in the public early and honestly will contribute to rebuilding
that trust and confidence. But it must be recognized that this is a
broader issue that relates to the society as a whole, not just to techno-
logical questions. In that sense, the ability to involve the public
successfully in decisions on and implementation of policies for nuclear
waste management is dependent on deep-seated developments in the general
political climate in the U.S. There is only a limited influence that the
manner of dealing with this particular issue can have on that larger question
of trust in the system.
II
Implications for Implementation
What are the implications of these propositions? Our goal is
to be able to reach decisions about a technically complex and necessarily
risky issue -- radioactive waste management -- and to be able to implement
those decisions. Let me briefly recapitulate the propositions:
-- a riskless technology is not possible;
-- agreement by the "experts" on the risks is not to be
expected;
- 13 -
-- no party to a public policy issue is completely
disinterested;
-- public participation does not automatically mean
understanding and acceptance;
-- access to information and analysis is essential
for participation; and
-- trust and confidence in the political system at
large is a necessary prerequisite for reaching and
carrying out decisions about controversial technol-
ogy involving substantial risk.
To what policies and measures, when combined with the specific
issues involved in waste management, do these propositions point?
It is obvious that there are no panaceas. In part this is so
because, as noted, the ability to deal with this issue is dependent on broader
questions of attitude in the society at large. In part it is because the
technical issues of nuclear waste management cannot be separated in the
policy process from the issues associated with nuclear power, such as the
need for reprocessing and breeder reactors, or from the licensing of reactors
themselves, now mandated by court decision. Nor can they be totally
separated from larger social issues such as energy policy, nuclear prolif-
eration, economic growth, inflation, and Middle East politics. And in
part it is because there are no short cuts nor assured outcomes of an open
policy process.
The major thrust of the arguments is simply that the policy process
must be, and be seen to be, open and fair. That will not guarantee that
closure can be reached on decisions and that those decisions ca- be imple-
mented, but it is increasingly a necessary aspect of the decision process.
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There are a series of approaches and policies that are relevant
to the goal; I will attempt to spell out a few of the more important in
brief compass.
1. Open Policy Discussions Starting at Early Stages
This is an obvious, if general, injunction which, however, is not
easy to carry out. It has little meaning unless other steps are followed
to make information and expertise available outside government and the
involved industry (suggested below). And there is necessarily great dif-
ficulty in defining where confidentiality and secrecy are legitimate. All
deliberations in government cannot be open: that results either in immobility
or the development of different forms of internal communication (telephone
calls instead of memos, few formal documents, etc.). Industry also has
legitimate need for protection of proprietary information and of develop-
ment of corporate plans.
But, self-conscious efforts can be made to create opportunities for
meaningful public discussion of policy options before decisions are reached.
As noted, it is important as well that these efforts be seen to be honest
in that they are genuinely held before agencies have decided on their
policy choices.
Policies for management of nuclear waste will now necessarily be
aired in the hearings required in the licensing process for power reactors,
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and in the development of environmental impact statements. In fact, it seems
likely that waste management will become a major factor in reactor licensing
debates. It would be a mistake to think of:these hearings as the first
step in obtaining public inputs in the decision process. Rather, through
means mentioned below, there should be ample opportunity prior to hearings
to elaborate options, encourage independent analysis, and engage in public
discussion.
2. Involvement of Other Institutions
The development of analyses and options should be carried out not
only inside the government and with industry that is directly involved,
but also with other institutions, such as universities and technical analysis
firms. This can serve the multiple objectives of making information and
analysis more generally available; of providing more options, from a
variety of perspectives, for consideration in policy deliberations; and of
contributing to consensus-building among institutions perceived by the public
to have less of a stake in particular policy outcomes and thus in some sense
serving as their representatives.
Inevitably, if the government sponsors such analyses, it will
mean supporting studies carried out by groups that may ultimately turn out
to be critics of the policies chosen. If the studies are in fact sponsored
before decisions are made there may be enough reflection of them in the
decisions to minimize opposition. In any case, one can hope that competent
studies will serve to make disagreements clearer and more easily debated.
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Since disagreements and varying assessments are unavoidable, any steps
that sharpen the real issues under dispute are likely to reduce confusion
and make choices easier.
The need for widespread involvement means that on important issues
it would be wise to commission studies by more than one outside institution.
There is nothing wrong, and much to be gained, by seeking analyses on the
same issues from multiple sources.
Government support for analytical studies also carries some dangers.
Over time, it may influence the attitudes of those who become dependent
on continuing funding and thus become a way of co-opting potential critics.
Providing for diversity of sources of funds from government can help to alleviate
that danger; better yet are analyses wholly supported from private resources.
3. Outside Reviews of Major Policy Analyses
When a government agency commissions a major study it intends to
use as a basis for policy decisions, it should also fund outside reviews of
that study to develop comments and highlight issues.
The commissioning of WASH 1400 (The Rasmussen Study of reactor
safety) did not satisfy that criterion, and the positive contributions of
that report may be reduced as a result. This study, dealing with an obviously
complex and central issue, was opened for public review and criticism before
being put in final form, but outside analysts were expected to find their
own resources. Gradually, after final completion of the study, some
questions have been emerging, now without adequate opportunity for discussion
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and debate before the conclusions have been "accepted" as the basis for
government policy. The result is to put into some question the credibility
of the entire analysis, whether warranted or not, and to give a weapon to
critics of nuclear energy that can go well beyond the actual deficiencies
of the study.
4. Public Forums
Public forums, presumably such as this one, held frequently or on
a continuing basis can provide occasions for airing of issues, for expres-
sions of the views of various groups, and for feedback. Again, these will
mean little unless there is adequate information, and resources available
for analysis outside government or industry.
5. Continuing Regulation and Control
The nuclear waste management problem appears to require continuing
political regulation and control to an unprecedented degree. The most
dramatic aspect is the persistence of the hazards over time scales well beyond
the lifespan of recorded society. That implies that the measures for dealing
with waste must not necessarily be dependent on organized human intervention,
but does not automatically mean the risks cannot be made acceptably small.
Clearly this aspect of the subject needs to be given special
attention early in public studies and discussion. It appears to be a rather
novel issue of public policy, though not in fact so different from problems
of dealing with toxic chemicals, and certainly is easy to dramatize beyond
its actual significance.
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It may well be wise for this reason alone, if for no other, to
create a new government body for the management of nuclear waste that has
single-minded responsibility for the problem. That will serve to enhance
the priority accorded to the issue over a longer time, and also help to
separate promotional objectives for nuclear power from management objectives
for handling the waste products.
Another aspect of the problem of regulation is more traditional,
whether entrusted to existing agencies or shared with a new body. The
history of regulation in the U.S. shows how easily the original basis of
operation of a regulatory agency can gradually alter until it becomes the
captive of the segment of society it was designed to oversee.
The reasons for this "capture" are to a considerable extent natural,
for over time the only groups who sustain interest and knowledge in a subject
are likely to be those with a specific stake in that subject. Others lose
interest,have other concerns, and find the difficulty of maintaining continued
competence in the subject too difficult. Thus they more easily accept (or
don't even notice) the gradual narrowing of the decision process whether that
happens naturally or by design. Until, of course, there is some crisis or
catastrophe, when it may be too late.
This narrowing of the regulatory process is inappropriate for most
technologies, and particularly so for nuclear technology and its waste
management aspects. There are no sure ways of preventing this from happening,
though assignment of management authority to a single agency may give the
regulatory problem more continuing visibility and thus more attention.
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Another, more ambitious course of action, is to develop institutions
outside those directly concerned with management or regulation that have
responsibility for analysis and challenge to government policies. Regu-
latory agencies are more likely to be independent regulators if interest
and knowledge about a subject is more widespread. Some steps along these
lines have been suggested earlier; other ideas of an institutional nature
are offered below.
6. Congress
Congress increasingly provides a route for the expression of public
concerns, for the dissemination of information and policy options. In
addition, Congressional resources for independent analysis of technologically-
related subjects are improving, through the creation of the Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA), strengthening of the Congressional Research
Service and the General Accounting Office, development of the new Congres-
sional Budget Office, and the possible establishment of a policy studies
organization for the Congress.
Congress thus is coming to have the competence to develop analyses
of issues and proposed policies that can provide some of that counterweight
to the dominant technological capability of Executive Agencies and of
industry. In this role, it can serve as a route for expression of general
interests, and as a means of maintaining technical competence outside govern-
ment and industry in complex technological areas.
Conscious development of Congressional resources for this purpose
could also be a route to stagnation if the result is increased Executive/
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Congressional confrontation. If, however, the Executive Branch recognizes
the role the Congress will play in questioning its policy recommendations
on technologically-related issues and therefore reaches out earlier for
more public involvement and debate, the results should be better and more
timely agreement.
The studies carried out under Congressional auspices are more likely
to reflect the views of interests outside the agencies or of directly-
involved industry. Thus, if those interests have already been involved in
policy discussions there is some greater likelihood of the development of
the consensus needed for action.
These Congressional resources can also play a role in the regulatory
process in the sense of being alert to problems that emerge once the
technologies are in place. OTA specifically has such a responsibility, and
could be a useful buffer against narrowing of the decision base with time.
7. Development of Institutions for Advocacy and for Objectivity
As society becomes increasingly committed to complex technology,
the problem of competent criticism in an adversary political process be-
comes ever more difficult. The rationale for this paper can in fact be
thought of as stemming from that growing problem.
An interesting question, going well beyond what can be discussed in
detail here, is whether and how the government in a representative democracy
should see itself as responsible for the creation and maintenance of
institutions designed to be analysts and critics of government policy and of
the regulatory mechanisms established by government. Many institutions
perform those functions n=w, especially universities and public interest
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groups, but the resource base is often inadequate or sometimes raises conflict
of interest questions.
Can (should) government agencies provide funds for institutional
support of their critics? Can it be done in ways that avoid loss of inde-
pendence over time? The NSF and NRC presumably would be more likely sources
of continuing funds free from influence than would, say, ERDA or NASA.
Would Congress accept such amission, or should it provide funding directly
as it does for OTA? There have been concrete proposals from some Congressmen
and Federal judges for just such funding to outside groups by Executive
and regulatory agencies.
In discussing the institutionalization of analysis and criticism of
government policy, it must be clear that there is not always an obvious
distinction between objectivity and advocacy. There is a tendency to deplore
individuals, particularly scientists and engineers, who use analysis for
advocacy purposes. Presumably, that is because it implies distortion of the
analysis, or at the least selective use of information. As noted in the
earlier propositions, however, there is inevitable pressure leading to
bias, or something less than disinterestedness, as soon as a person becomes
a party to a public policy issue.
However, that does not mean we are doomed always to discount every-
one's views (with whom we don't agree) as hopelessly biased. Here the
traditions and mores of the scientific community and of the universities
become very important.
For what the society needs is both institutions for advocacy and
for objectivity. The existing base of individuals competent to understand
high technology issues and their implications is narrow. That implies
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that groups involved in such an issue but not adequately represented in
the government's decision process are likely to be underrepresented.
Individuals or institutions able to work with the technology, and that have
access to information, are needed in that avowedly advocacy role to repre-
sent those interests.
But then also needed are institutions outside of government able
to provide a base of expertise not beholden to specific .government policies
or industrial interests that could analyze issues and provide a basis
for resolving disagreements. Complete objectivity is not achievable, but
over time a striving for disinterestedness and reliance on scientific
norms could bring confidence in such institutions and help them provide a
needed mediatory capability. Their authority would come from expertise
and confidence built up over time, not from any formal grant of responsibility.
Whether such instituions should be sought among those that already
exist, or new ones created, or both, deserves much attention and discussion.
The "science court" is presumably one such proposal, but in my view is not
a likely success, and may even be a diversion. Other ideas are possible
or have been suggested and need development. My own guess is-that existing
institutions, in particular universities, the National Academy of Sciences,
and research centers, already engaged in the task, are more likely candidates.
The judicial process in the U.S. is also becoming a major "institution"
for the resolution of disputes related to technology. The ability of that
process to deal adequately with technological issues is very much in question
and needs urgent attention and, probably, invention. The development of
institutions competent to deal with technologically-related policies and
accepted as disinterested and reasonably objective, could have an important
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role to play in the judicial process.
I am impelled in this discussion to point out the cost to the
authority of science and technology of having scientists and engineers
operating in both advocacy and adjudicatory roles. This is likely to be
a real cost, but since we already see scientists and engineers in advocacy
roles, to the discomfiture of some of their colleagues, there is little to
do but accept it and focus on the development of needed institutions.
Perhaps others would have different views on this from the perspective of
the norms and values of the scientific community.
8. Bringing Industry Along
All too often in the U.S. today, attitudes toward business
are polarized, with many seeing industry as dominated solely by improper motives,
and others uncritically arguing for reduced regulation of industry.
In fact, a technological society requires change and technological
innovation. The source of that innovation, which is largely in industry,
can be adversely affected by a system that makes change too difficult, or
removes the incentives for innovation. But imposition of restrictions
with such effects can be prevented from happening only by reestablishing the
trust, the reasonable confidence, that the policy process will reflect
the concerns of all interested parties and not only those with narrow
economic interests in the outcome.
Industry, then, must be very much a part of the measurel for open-
ness described above. Industrial motivations and objectives must be ade-
quately, and fairly, represented in the process. That also implies a
willingness by industry-to recognize the need for full and informed parti-
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cipation by other interested parties, including those who do not share
the same objectives on particular issues.
- III
Radioactive waste management represents the kind of technologically
complex and risk-laden subject that cannot be isolated from the social
issues in which it is embedded, and yet which must be dealt with just because
of its relation to broader social issues. It is essentially a paradigm for
the kinds of central questions with which the society must deal while pre-
serving a democratic political process. And it is particularly relevant
because the nature of the technology implies adequate measures over unprece-
dented spans of time.
The delicate balance between a regressive stalemate and authoritarian
decisions about social policy must be achieved. In large measure whether we
are able to do so or not will be determined by the ability to build a decision
process with competent participation by those concerned and with willingness
to accept the decisions that result.
